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Executive Summary
The arsenals that several regimes in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) deployed to repress demo-
cracy movements in 2011 were seen to contain European-supplied arms. This observation challenges the 
arms exports control system that EU Member States have developed to ensure their decision-making on 
military exports takes into account political and moral concerns that are being raised in their constituencies. 
The current events in the Arab world provide grounds to evaluate and possibly rethink the EU arms export 
control system.
While the system is a distinct improvement on what went before, and the level of control exercised in the 
EU is in many ways setting the global lead, the deployment of European arms to repress the demands for 
democracy in several countries in MENA, and more broadly the willingness to transfer arms where the risk of 
such behaviour was very real, suggest that the EU system is still far from perfect. 
This report analyses EU arms exports to MENA, in recent years both from an overarching perspective as well 
as detailing speci"c transfers. While the particular timing and nature of the Arab Spring itself could not be 
predicted, the potential for trouble at some point and the responding State repression could hardly be a sur-
prise given the nature of these authoritarian regimes. While NGOs over the years have questioned a number 
of arms sales to undemocratic regimes with a history of violating human rights, the Arab Spring appeared to 
be a necessary condition for EU governments to recognise that the implementation of their export control 
policies had failed on numerous occasions. This analysis probes the level of caution EU exporting authorities 
demonstrated. The aim is to identify patterns of poor decision-making on arms exports where they exist, 
to consider why such patterns exist and to suggest remedies. Demands for socio-economic improvements 
as well as civil liberties, as they emerged in numerous Arab countries over the past year, are not likely to die 
soon, nor are these demands constrained to the Arab world.  
Standing slightly apart from some of the other issues raised herein, the report also considers what appears 
to be a longstanding loophole of the EU system, whereby non-military equipment is exported with the in-
tention of being converted to military speci"cations and for military or security use in the destination state, 
without the need for authorisation.
This report urges EU Member States to take advantage of the opportunity provided by the forthcoming re-
view of the Common Position to improve the existing system and adapt their current export policies, imple-
menting more comprehensive measures to prevent military goods from being used to oppress legitimate 
demands for democratic reform. 
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Recommendations
The following is a list of recommendations that !ow from the events and repercussions of the Arab Spring, 
and that we would hope can be considered in the context of the forthcoming review of the Common Posi-
tion. In some cases they merely point to a potentially productive line of enquiry for the review to pursue. In 
other instances they are more concrete.
The recommendations also address both the future substance of the EU arms transfer control regime, and 
the process of the review itself.
1.  The review of the Common Position should be thorough and comprehensive, with a view 
to producing substantive recommendations for change. It should follow a lessons-learned ap-
proach, with some concentration on events in MENA (including generating an historical perspective) 
but with a view to applying those lessons more widely. The review should be transparent, and seek 
the views of external actors by inter alia interactive means, such as workshops and the taking and 
interrogation of evidence. The review should have an interim stage, at which preliminary "ndings can 
be shared with external stakeholders and responses requested and considered.
2. Member States should examine how to manage what is at its core a permissive licensing process 
when considering licence applications for transfers to states where there are particular ‘reasons to 
be concerned’. A useful way forward could be to establish a list of ‘countries of concern’, updated 
regularly, drawing on work done on related issues such as con!ict prevention, early warning, con!ict-
a#ected and fragile states, security sector reform, good governance etc., but also drawing upon the 
speci"c experience and understanding of licensing authorities (note that this would be in addition to 
countries under embargo, not instead of or as a means for extending the application of embargoes). 
 For transfers to these states, Member States would then operate a policy of ‘presumption of deni-
al’. This would still involve a case-by-case approach, but instead of the current practice of approving 
a licence application unless there is a speci"c reason for refusing it, licences would be refused unless 
a legitimate defence need can be demonstrated, and the applicant can satisfy the licensing authority 
that the equipment will be used only in support of that need.
 Information currently circulated among Member States regarding licence denials would be circulated 
for licences granted to countries on the list of concern. As well, information would be shared about 
the legitimate defence relevant to the transfer. 
3. Consideration should be given to establishing a new criterion, or elaborating on existing criteria to 
explicitly consider governance as a risk factor.  Much work has been done on this since the eight 
existing criteria were agreed, and it is incumbent on Member States to ensure that the transfer con-
trol system keeps pace with relevant developments.  
 The Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), which consider six dimensions of governance (voice and 
accountability; political stability and absence of violence; government e#ectiveness; regulatory qual-
ity; rule of law; and control of corruption) may be of interest here.1 Looking at the indicators for Libya, 
for example, would have given great cause for concern well ahead of the Arab Spring. 
1  ‘Governance indicators on 1996-2011’ are available from the Worldwide Governance Indicators Project that is managed by Daniel 
Kaufman (Brookings Institution), Aart Kraay (World Bank Development Research Group) and Massimo Mastruzzi (World Bank 
Institute).
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 A governance criterion might also be of assistance in the context of the message that arms sales de-
liver about the way the transferring state views the importing regime. Supplying arms can be seen 
as conferring legitimacy on or at least acknowledging the legitimacy of a regime that may be com-
pletely unrepresentative and potentially predatory. Linking this together with the above mentioned 
list of countries of concern and the application of a presumption of denial for those countries would 
help give some direction to the circumstances where this is likely to be relevant.  
4. States need to look at how to ensure that assessment processes take account of longer-term or 
over-the-horizon risks. This is likely to require greater external input into the provision of relevant 
information. Meaningful longer-term analysis will almost certainly require more detailed knowledge 
and contextual understanding than a licensing o$cial could be expected to have. Consulting with 
geographical desks within government would be a start, but involving external, independent ex-
perts will be critical to the quality of the analysis. Member States should consider how to co-operate 
to generate this analysis in the most e$cient way possible without compromising quality. 
5.  Member States need to be much clearer regarding the way the relationship between the restric-
tive criteria and economic, foreign policy and strategic interests works in practice. When ques-
tioned about individual authorisations, EU Member State governments will typically insist that they 
are always assessed with equal rigour against the Common Position criteria, but as is demonstrated 
by cases described in this report, refusing to admit that sometimes other issues take precedence 
strains credibility. As part of the review, Member States should have a frank discussion regarding 
the way they manage the competing interests relevant to licensing decisions, and how this needs to 
change to minimise the risk that any arms transfers will have negative consequences.  
6. As hinted at by several of the previous recommendations, EU Member States should be using a 
joined-up government approach to arms transfer controls, linking policy and decision-making in 
this area with new thinking on issues around development and security, governance, peace-building, 
con!ict prevention, con!ict-a#ected and fragile states, security sector reform, etc.  
7. Current information-sharing and -exchange procedures among COARM need to be improved. 
With the stakes involved, once again as demonstrated by events in MENA, it is not acceptable that EU 
Member States are limiting themselves to the periodic circulation of a CD containing licence denial 
information and to information-sharing through personal contacts. While these contacts are irre-
placeable in terms of level of detail and nuance in speci"c cases, they are also arbitrary and subject 
to frequent disruption due to sta# turnover. Consistency of information shared is not feasible, nor 
can longer-term institutional memories be developed. Systematic information sharing must be de-
veloped for, for example, assessments of risks to certain end-users, countries or regions; problematic 
trade routes, brokers or transporters; on situation of unauthorised end-use, end-users, or problematic 
re-export. Better information-sharing could be used to identify spikes or unusual patterns in a pur-
chaser’s or end-user’s e#orts to procure controlled items from di#erent states. Modern digital data-
management systems need to be developed so that this information can be uploaded and circulated 
in real time. 
 All this information could be of critical importance with regard to certain licence applications, and is 
being held within national structures, but advantage is not being taken of it. Better information-shar-
ing would not only improve decision-making, but could, if well-managed, reduce the workload of 
licensing o$cials. It may also help to develop the aforementioned personal contacts, in that o$cials 
would be given more reason to contact COARM colleagues to "nd out more about why certain export 
licensing decisions were taken, or what they mean. As mentioned above, we would also recommend 
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developing a greater level of information-sharing regarding licences issued to those on the list of 
countries of concern.
8. A further improvement in transparency is necessary, not least so that regional experts could have 
better information on which to base any approach to governments regarding the wisdom and risks 
of actual or proposed transfers. EU Member States should be giving greater detail on the proposed 
end-users of the items being licenced, the quantities of equipment being delivered and on transfer 
policies and their implementation to speci"c states.
9. The Dual-use Regulation should be updated to make it completely clear that goods which 
would normally not be subject to controls but which were to be adapted for a military or secu-
rity end-use would become subject to transfer controls, regardless of the "nal destination. If the 
company concerned knew or should have reasonably been expected to have known that this was 
going to happen, then it would be the responsibility of the company to advise the licensing authority 
accordingly. And of course if the authorities knew about the revised end-use, they would be required 
to alert the company that licences would have to be applied for.   
No doubt the course of the review will throw up other ideas and opportunities to improve the existing sys-
tem. Civil society looks forward to participating in a constructive process that delivers those improvements 
in a way that helps protect the rights and freedoms of people from all around the world.
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Glossary
Arab Spring
The Arab Spring is a revolutionary wave of de-
monstrations and protests occurring in the Arab 
world. Since 18 December 2010 there have been 
revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt; a civil war in Libya 
resulting in the fall of its regime; civil uprisings in 
Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen; major protests in Algeria, 
Iraq, Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, and minor protests 
in Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
and Western Sahara. The protests have shared 
techniques of civil resistance in sustained campaigns 
involving strikes, demonstrations, marches and 
rallies, as well as the use of social media to organise, 
communicate, and raise awareness in the face of state 
attempts at repression and internet censorship. Many 
demonstrations have also met violent responses 
from authorities.
COARM
Working Party on Conventional Arms Exports, where 
the 27 EU Member States’ representatives convene at 
level of the EU Council.
EU Code of Conduct
European Union, the Council, Code of Conduct on 
arms exports, as adopted on 5 June 1998. 8675/2/98, 
REV 2, DG E - PESC IV. This instrument outlined eight 
minimum criteria against which arms transfers should 
be checked. In 2008, this EU Code was superseded by 
the Common Position.
Common Position 
European Union, the Council, Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP of 8 December 2008 de"ning 
common rules governing control of exports of 
military technology and equipment, as published in 
O!cial Journal of the European Union on 13 December 
2008 as L 335/99. The Common Position criteria are 
copied in the annex with this report.
Consolidated Report or Annual Report
From 1999 onwards, the EU Council publishes annual 
reports on Member States’ compliance with its 
arms export control regime. The latest issues report 
on compliance with the Common Position. These 
reports are compilations of trade "gures from the 
EU Member States’ national reports sorted into EU 
Common Military List categories, and can include 
information on the number of export licences the 
Member States have issued in a speci"c year, value 
of these export licences and value of actual exports, 
although not all states provide all the information. 
The report also includes the licence applications the 
Member States formally denied and the grounds for 
these denials. The most recent, 12th Annual Report, 
that covers trade year 2009, was published in the 
O$cial Journal of the European Union on 13 January 
2011 as 2011/C 9. 
Dual-use Regulation
EU Council Regulation (EC) No 428/2009 of 5 May 
setting up a Community regime for the control 
of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-
use items. The instrument is the latest recast of the 
Regulation that set up the Community regime for 
that control in 2000. As a Regulation rather than a 
Directive, a Common Position, or Code of Conduct, 
this regime is automatically incorporated in all EU 
Member States national systems of control.
GCC
Gulf Cooperation Council, or Cooperation Council for 
the Arab States of the Gulf. Member States are the 
Kingdom of Bahrain, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, the Sultanate of Oman and the United 
Arab Emirates (UAE).
Licence Denial
In the speci"c context of reporting on arms exports, 
‘denial’ refers to the non-approval of an export 
licence application by an EU Member State and the 
sending of noti"cation to COARM for inclusion in a 
con"dential ‘denials database’. However the reservoir 
of denial noti"cations does not cover all exports of 
military products and technologies that EU Member 
States refuse to authorise, as applicants may receive 
a ‘preliminary noti"cation’ or ‘informal denial’ that 
causes further steps in the licence process to be 
aborted. In that case, the EU Member State will 
not issue a ‘formal denial’ subject to noti"cation to 
COARM.
Major Conventional Weapons
As used here the term covers a wide range of military 
goods, including military aircraft and helicopters; 
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armoured vehicles; surveillance systems; "re-
control radars, anti-submarine warfare and anti-ship 
sonar systems for ships and helicopters; air defence 
systems; powered, guided missiles and torpedoes 
with conventional warheads, ships with a standard 
tonnage of at least 100 tonnes and/or armed with 
artillery of 100mm calibre or more, torpedoes or 
guided missiles; engines for military aircraft, for 
combat vehicles and for most armoured vehicles; 
turrets for armoured vehicles and for ships; and 
artillery (naval, "xed, self-propelled and towed guns, 
howitzers, multiple rocket launchers and mortars, 
with a calibre of at least 100mm).
MENA
Acronym commonly used to refer to the countries 
that constitute the Middle East and North Africa, 
that is Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, 
Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, 
the Palestinian controlled territories, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 
the Western Sahara and Yemen. Some institutions 
additionally categorise Sudan and/or Mauritania in 
North Africa, and hence in MENA.
Common Military List
The most recent version of the Common Military 
List (ML) of the European Union was adopted by the 
Council on 15 February 2010 and published in the 
O!cial Journal of the European Union on 18 March 
2010, C69/19-51. The List describes 22 categories 
of equipment covered by the Council Common 
Position. These categories are referred to as ML1, 
ML2, and so on. 
SALW
The acronym SALW, for small arms and light weapons, 
refers to any man-portable lethal weapon that expels 
or launches, is designed to expel or launch, or may be 
readily converted to expel or launch a shot, bullet or 
projectile by the action of an explosive. 
Small arms are weapons designed for individual 
use. They include small calibre "rearms, such as 
revolvers and self-loading pistols, ri!es and carbines, 
sub-machine guns, assault ri!es and man-portable 
machine guns. The EU Common Position and Military 
List system categorises these small arms as ML1: 
Smooth-bore weapons with a calibre of less than 
20 mm, other arms and automatic weapons with a 
calibre of 12,7 mm (calibre 0,50 inches) or less and 
accessories, and specially designed components 
therefore. 
Light weapons are weapons designed for use by two 
or three persons serving as a crew, although some 
may be carried and used by a single person. These 
are described under ML2: Smooth-bore weapons 
with a calibre of 20 mm or more, other weapons 
or armament with a calibre greater than 12,7 mm 
(calibre 0,50 inches), projectors and accessories, 
and specially designed components therefor. They 
include medium machine guns, heavy machine 
guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade 
launchers, portable anti-aircraft guns, portable anti-
tank guns, recoilless ri!es, portable launchers of anti-
tank missile and rocket systems, portable launchers 
of anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of a 
calibre of less than 100 millimetres.
Transfer system
The term is used in this report in a broader sense than 
‘arms export control system’, as it also incorporates 
brokering licences and transits.
UAV
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle.
UN Register of Conventional Arms (UNROCA)
The Register was established by UN Resolution 
46/36L on Transparency in Armaments and adopted 
on 9 October 1991. It calls on all UN Member States to 
report the number of arms in seven categories (battle 
tanks, attack helicopters, armoured combat vehicles, 
large calibre artillery systems, combat aircraft, 
warships) exported or imported from their territory 
during the calendar year. There is also optional 
reporting on SALW imports and exports. Information 
contributed by country to UNROCA is available to all 
countries and is compiled by the Secretary General in 
a report to the UN General Assembly. Unfortunately, 
not all States report. 
User’s Guide
The User’s Guide to Council Common Position 
2008/944/CFSP de"nes common rules governing 
the control of exports of military technology and 
equipment. 
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Introduction
The system of arms transfer controls agreed by EU 
Member States is widely regarded as among the 
most elaborate and sophisticated in the world. The 
centrepiece of the control system is the 2008 legally-
binding Common Position de"ning common rules 
governing control of exports of military technology 
and equipment (Common Position), which replaced 
the politically-binding 1998 EU Code of Conduct on 
Arms Exports. It is supported and elaborated through 
a number of other instruments and documents such 
as the 2003 Common Position on the control of arms 
brokering and the periodically-updated User’s Guide 
to the Common Position.
The key purpose of the Common Position is to ensure 
that EU Member States do not transfer strategic goods 
and technology that will then be used in breach of 
various criteria. These criteria address issues such as 
human rights and international humanitarian law, 
regional peace, security and stability, and sustainable 
development.  
However recent revelations about arms transfers 
authorised by EU Member States to the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) suggest that no matter how 
sophisticated the EU system may be, there are !aws 
in its implementation and possibly in terms of the 
language and content of its underlying documents.  
In light of these apparent problems, it is perhaps 
fortuitous timing that Member States are obliged, 
by Article 15 of the Common Position, to review its 
implementation starting no later than December 
2011. This report is intended to be a constructive 
contribution to the review; the civil society 
community from which it springs looks forward to an 
ongoing engagement on this issue with EU Member 
States and the review process as it moves forward.  
The con!icted Common Position
The Common Position is an imperfect instrument. 
This is probably inevitable, as it is a negotiated 
attempt to capture in one place a set of complicated 
and sometimes competing objectives by states with 
di#erent perspectives and interests. 
Included among the goals and objectives of the 
Common Position are to: 
!"develop high common standards of arms trans-
fer control and strengthen EU export control 
policy; 
!"prevent the export of arms which might be used 
for internal repression or international aggres-
sion or contribute to regional instability;
!"improve information-sharing; 
!"reinforce cooperation and promote conver-
gence in the "eld of arms exports;
!"maintain and strengthen a European defence 
and industrial base and a defence capability.2
The two clearly contrasting drivers of the Common 
Position are immediately apparent, i.e. to place limits 
on trade where it would have a negative outcome 
and to promote trade so as to strengthen economic 
and strategic capacity in EU Member States.  
Attempts are made within the Common Position to 
prioritise among these competing objectives. Two 
references stand out: 
Article 2.5 (a) requires states to consider: 
the potential e#ect of the military technology 
or equipment to be exported on their defence 
and security interests as well as those of Member 
State and those of friendly and allied countries, 
while recognising that this factor cannot a#ect 
consideration of the criteria on respect for 
human rights and on regional peace, security and 
stability.
Article 10 allows that Member States may 
“take into account the e#ect of proposed exports 
on their economic, social, commercial and 
industrial interests”, however it directs that “these 
factors shall not a#ect the application of the 
[Common Position] criteria.
2 See the preamble to the Common Position.
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Less immediately obvious is another tension. 
The notion of convergence, co-operation and 
harmonisation is promoted but decision-making 
is taken at the national level. When these di#erent 
tensions are considered in combination with the 
fact that the wording of the Common Position has 
been purposefully crafted so as to allow room for 
judgement and interpretation, it should come as 
no surprise that consistent and rigorous application 
of the Common Position will mean di#erent things 
to di#erent authorities at di#erent times.  Di#erent 
actors operating in good faith may therefore arrive 
at di#erent decisions in the same circumstances. 
However this also gives an excuse for poor decision-
making, and it is not at all clear how the articles 2.5. 
(a) and 10 referred to above are managed in practice.
NGOs have long argued that EU Member States 
have not got the balance right, and the revelations 
that have attended the Arab Spring support this 
assertion.  Moreover, the events of the Arab Spring 
are a reminder of the consequences of getting this 
wrong: people’s and whole societies’ lives, livelihoods 
and futures are at stake. The conclusions are obvious: 
Member States need to improve implementation, or 
the Common Position and accompanying documents 
are in need of amendment.  Or both.  
Lessons from the Arab Spring
As mentioned above, and discussed in more detail in 
the sections that follow, the current EU regime does 
not appear to have generated the necessary restraint 
among Member States in terms of arms supplies 
to MENA.  The case-by-case approach to licensing 
which is set out in the Common Position allows 
authorities to ignore the broader picture with regard 
to, for example authoritarian rule and a poor general 
human rights record, on the grounds that the risk 
of misuse of the particular equipment proposed for 
transfer is not high enough to merit refusal.  When 
coupled with the approach widely-used in EU 
Member States, whereby the default position is that 
licences are granted unless there is a compelling 
reason to deny, it is easy to see how a culture of 
approving marginal cases could develop.  This raises 
the prospect of considering an alternative approach 
where the nature of the recipient state is such that it 
might be regarded as higher risk in general.  
As will be set out in more detail below, other issues 
that the Arab Spring has thrown up include the 
related question of how to develop a licensing 
policy appropriate to a state that is apparently 
stable, or at least in the sense that for an extended 
period there has been no large-scale political 
violence, when that stability has been created by an 
oppressive regime. In this context it might be useful 
for licensing authorities to reimagine the concept of 
‘stability’ along the lines as set out in the July 2011 UK 
Building Stability Overseas Strategy (BSOS), which 
characterises stability in terms of:
political systems which are representative and 
legitimate, capable of managing con!ict and 
change peacefully, and societies in which human 
rights and rule of law are respected, basic needs 
are met, security established and opportunities 
for social and economic development are open to 
all. This type of ‘structural stability’, which is built 
on the consent of the population, is resilient and 
!exible in the face of shocks, and can evolve over 
time as the context changes.3
Another pattern that seems to be emerging out of 
the response to the Arab Spring relates to the issue of 
the tension between applying the restrictive criteria 
and promoting economic and strategic interests. 
Most obvious is the way in which business with the 
largest customer in MENA, Saudi Arabia, seems to 
be business-as-usual, despite, for example, their 
willingness to crack down hard upon internal dissent, 
their dispatch of armoured vehicles to Bahrain and 
their earlier use of aircraft in Yemen. This is examined 
in more detail below.
It may also be the case that Member States need to 
reconsider how to assess the risk of use of certain 
types of equipment against domestic populations 
in protest situations.  The use by Libyan troops of all 
kinds of military equipment to quell protests, the use 
3 Department for International Development, Foreign and 
Commonwealth O$ce and Ministry of Defence, ‘Building 
Stability Overseas Strategy’ (BSOS), July 2011, p. 5.
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of tanks and heavy weaponry to do the same in Syria, 
suggest the traditional understanding of the risks 
that are associated with this more major equipment 
may need to be rethought.  
Hopefully the Arab spring will turn out to be a wake-
up call for European governments that more needs to 
be done to avoid the risk of weapons supplied with 
their consent being used against peaceful protesters, 
as happened on the streets of numerous towns in 
MENA this year.  
Critically, there is a need to assess whether the EU-
supplied arms that were deployed against civilians 
on the streets in MENA were the fruits of the 
accidental few stray deals, or a tip of an iceberg, or 
the logical outcome of trade in military goods with 
recipient states to which we ‘could have attributed’ 
a pro"le likely to turn violent towards their own 
civilian populations either sooner or later. Is it fair 
to conclude the EU regulatory system ‘failed’ to 
prevent such deals? Did it fail because not all EU 
States followed the agreed rules with enough rigour 
or because the corpus of agreed rules themselves is 
inadequate, incomplete and in need of improvement 
or tightening? What lessons can these apparent 
failures inspire to avoid similarly problematic arms 
trade deals to these same recipients and/or to end 
users in other regions that stand a risk to develop a 
similar security problem? 
In order to address these and similar questions, the 
"rst chapter pro"les EU trade in military goods and 
technology with MENA, comparing it with EU trade 
in these goods with other regions, calculating its 
"nancial value and assessing the level of restraint 
that EU authorities were seen to exert in assessing 
export licence requests for that region. The report 
then moves on to discuss a number of deals that went 
through in recent years that proved controversial. For 
this section, we have revisited several reports that 
NGOs from several EU Member States published in 
the recent past. 
The mechanics that ensured these deals took place 
are examined in some detail, with an aim to identify 
the more fundamental problems EU Member States 
may be having in applying their agreed rules. In 
addition the report identi"es problematic cases 
even where arms transfer licensing rules have been 
followed, which suggests that the rules themselves 
are not always good enough. The report then seeks 
to identify the main problem areas in existing EU 
arms transfer control policy and practice, to help 
improve compliance with the relevant instruments, 
and to suggest possible remedies where the system 
is not achieving its designated goals. 
Possibilities for improvement
With a review of the implementation of the Common 
Position scheduled to start before the end of 2011, 
this report hopes to contribute to that review 
process, presenting critical evidence-based analysis 
by a number of arms transfer control researchers. 
For a robust arms trade policy, EU Member States 
should realise that national self-interest should 
not overrule the ethical guidelines of the criteria of 
the Common Position. If they are serious with their 
expressed determination to “prevent the export of 
military technology and equipment which might 
be used for internal repression or international 
aggression or contribute to regional instability” they 
should make sure their human rights, development 
and con!ict prevention policies include a strong 
position on arms trade. The Arab Spring has shown 
that if arms exporting states fail to do so, the 
consequences can be severe. 
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